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# THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INDEX 2007

Measuring Commitment to Best Practice

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# The Humanitarian Response Index 2007

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## I. Introduction

Humanitarian interventions targeting persons affected by humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters around the globe are perceived to be falling far short of existing humanitarian needs and are often not guided by acknowledged principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Donor policy and decision making have been criticised for being compromised by competing and sometimes inconsistent domestic and foreign policy considerations, resulting in funding allocations that are inequitable, unpredictable, and untimely in responding to crises. Earmarking and tied aid, short funding cycles, unrequited pledges, and late funding have all played a role in further reducing the effectiveness of humanitarian action.<sup>2</sup>

To address many of these issues, the international donor community resolved to strengthen its response to humanitarian crises by pursuing enhanced effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability in humanitarian action through the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative.<sup>3</sup> The GHD provides a forum for discussion of good practices and encouraging greater donor accountability, as well as providing a framework from which to assess official humanitarian action.<sup>4</sup> Most importantly, it enshrines those *Principles* that are widely accepted as representing best practice in the area of humanitarian donorship, thereby establishing a normative benchmark for humanitarian donors.

Underlying the GHD Initiative are the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* (the *Principles*) established in 2003 (Box 1), which define the objectives of humanitarian action: “to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.” Further, they spell out the principles that should guide humanitarian action, namely humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, as well as

those embedded in the body of international human rights and humanitarian law. The *Principles* also set out good practices in donor financing, management, and accountability.

Recognising the need to strengthen accountability through monitoring of humanitarian donorship, the *Principles* contain a commitment to “learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action” (Principle [P] 21) as well as to the “regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance” (P 22).

In the spirit of these principles and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action, this chapter presents the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI), a tool designed to measure how well humanitarian donors are performing relative to their commitment to the *Principles*. The HRI is intended to help identify and understand donors’ strengths and weaknesses in the area of humanitarian action in order, ultimately, to improve the quality of humanitarian action and alleviate human suffering in crisis situations. This study hopes to raise awareness about the increasingly important role that good humanitarian donorship can play in setting standards in this area, both within and beyond its current core constituencies.

This chapter is organised as follows. Section II provides a brief overview of accountability initiatives already underway within the international humanitarian community and to which the HRI is complementary. Section III describes the methodological underpinnings of the HRI and provides a detailed description of the indicators used to compile the Index. Section IV presents the Index results for 2007, with the main highlights, followed by the conclusions.

### Box 1. Principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship

*Endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003 by Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.*

#### Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

#### General principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.

8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

#### Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

##### (a) Funding

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations.
13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

### Box 1. Principles and good practice of humanitarian donorship (cont'd.)

#### (b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.
16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

#### (c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

## II. Accountability within the international humanitarian community

### The GHD Principles

At the First International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship, on 17 June 2003 in Stockholm, sixteen states and the European Commission endorsed the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*.<sup>5</sup> Since then, seven more states have joined the GHD Initiative,<sup>6</sup> meaning that all 23 Member States of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) and its Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as well as the Czech Republic, have now endorsed the *Principles*.

In practice, progress towards implementing the *Principles* has been limited, in part because of differences in priorities and approaches to implementation and in interpretation and application of humanitarian principles, but also because of limited advocacy efforts on the part of stakeholders holding donors to account for their commitments.<sup>7</sup> It is therefore timely to introduce a new mechanism to help strengthen donor progress towards GHD.

### Existing mechanisms to strengthen accountability

At the intergovernmental level, the DAC endorsed the *Principles* in April 2005 as the standard against which the work of its 23 members should be judged and against which they can be held accountable. Humanitarian donorship is now evaluated separately within the DAC's Peer Review process<sup>8</sup> according to a GHD Assessment Framework.<sup>9</sup> The assessments are of a qualitative nature and are carried out by a Peer Review team based on a fact-finding mission to the donor capital and field locations, and aimed at monitoring implementation of GHD principles and practices. The reports maintain a common format in order to be comparable across countries and cover six key areas. In this context, peer review can play a useful role in "identifying issues of policy coherence, as well as the linkages and logic of domestic policies that have a positive or negative impact on decisions and delivery of Humanitarian Action."<sup>10</sup>

Individual countries have also established country-specific systems to monitor GHD implementation at the country level but these were limited in scope.<sup>11</sup> Canada has developed performance indicators, while the UK government has set targets in its Public Service Agreement that govern budget allocations.

Donors have also worked on collective indicators to help track *collective* progress. The indicators developed in this context focused on three elements of the *Principles*, namely, that (i) donor funding was flexible and timely; (ii) donor and agency funding for Consolidated Appeals Processes (CAPs) and Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAPs) was allocated on the basis of needs assessment; and (iii) donors advocated for, and supported, coordination mechanisms. Progress against these has been measured using 2004 data as a baseline and is reported in the annual *Global Humanitarian Assistance* (GHA) publications.<sup>12</sup> In the July 2007 GHD meeting, a new set of improved indicators of wider scope was agreed upon.

As they are directly attributable to donor action, these indicators can make an important contribution to strengthening donor accountability. However, due to their collective nature, they cannot assess individual donor performance, a central aim of the present study. Moreover, they still cover only a subset of the *Principles* and are, therefore, viewed as too narrow to provide a comprehensive assessment of the GHD framework.

At the field level, two country pilots in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were launched to test the GHD by developing collective impact indicators derived from the *Principles*.<sup>13</sup> These were considerably more comprehensive in scope than the collective GHD indicators, encompassing forty-two indicators that span fourteen different *Principles*.<sup>14</sup> However, these indicators cannot be clearly attributed to the performance of specific humanitarian actors and are focussed heavily on the multilateral CAP/CHAP framework.<sup>15</sup>

Another contribution to boost the GHD's collective performance measurement system was proposed by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).<sup>16</sup> Their focus was on indicators that measure donors' responsibilities in relation to Principles 4 through 10. Underlying these is the intention to establish realistic and achievable targets against which progress can be measured. However, the authors concede that baselines do not currently exist for many of the proposed indicators. Moreover, the indicators would appear to be particularly difficult and time-consuming to quantify, thereby reducing their practical value.

### III. The Humanitarian Response Index

#### Objectives of the HRI

The overview of GHD-based donor assessments shows the importance that the donor community attributes to the GHD initiative and reinforces its status as a benchmark for best practice in humanitarian donorship. However, the lack of comprehensive impact indicators for measuring donor performance continues to be identified as an outstanding challenge.<sup>17</sup>

The fact remains that the endorsement of the GHD *Principles*, as any code of conduct, constitutes only a *voluntary* effort on the part of donors that is non-binding. Moreover, the environment of humanitarian action is increasingly characterised by greater donor intervention and a considerably broadened scope of humanitarian policy, reaching well beyond mere humanitarian assistance to cover development and conflict reduction objectives. These leave the humanitarian field open to donor expediency not necessarily consonant with the principles and good practices of good humanitarian donorship.

Underlying the HRI is the rationale that a benchmarking mechanism could measurably strengthen donors' voluntary commitment to the *Principles*. International benchmarking has had considerable success across various fields as a mechanism for imposing additional discipline. For example, annual benchmarking exercises carried out by organisations such as the Centre for Global Development's *Commitment to Development Index*, Transparency International in the area of the prevalence of corruption and the World Economic Forum's competitiveness indices are seen to have contributed to focussing attention on the part of policy-makers, the business community and civil society on the need for reforms to improve important elements of the institutional environment.

As an alternative to a binding (legal) obligation, benchmarking works through peer pressure to motivate actors to improve efficiency, correct deficiencies in the policy framework, and possibly even avert damage to a country's reputation, thereby achieving improved performance without resorting to more stringent disciplining mechanisms. The HRI would therefore seem particularly well suited as a complement to the voluntary endorsement donors have made to the *Principles*. It offers an important platform for assessing the quality of donors' humanitarian involvement over time in a consistent, transparent, internationally comparable, and peer-reviewed manner.

The primary value of international benchmarking through an index is less in the rankings themselves and more in the opportunities provided by the underlying data collected for meaningful comparative analysis, both as regards a country's performance in relation to that of others and over time in relation to its own past.

There are two important distinctions between international benchmarking, as used in the HRI, and some of the work on developing indicators for impact assessment in the humanitarian field, described above. First, international benchmarking does not seek to set targets for indicators, in the sense of the Millennium Development Goals, against which progress is measured. Instead, it provides a relative standard of benchmarking between countries for any given period for which the assessment is undertaken. This has the advantage of avoiding the pitfall of having to set targets for each indicator, which, especially in the case of qualitative indicators, is fraught with problems, as it is difficult to find either theoretical or empirical underpinnings for such an exercise. Second, an important aim of this study is to assess donor countries on an *individual* basis, as too strong a focus on collective targets and assessments can result in free-riding that can seriously impede progress towards implementing the GHD commitments at the country operational level.<sup>18</sup>

Several key considerations have been taken into account when developing the HRI. First, due to its complex nature, we came to the view that individual donor behaviour would best be described by a combination of both qualitative and quantitative indicators. Since the *Principles* encompass a number of broad objectives, it would have been too limiting to attempt to assess compliance with respect to them by focussing only on quantitative indicators, valuable as these are. Indeed, there are a number of principles that cannot be easily captured by hard data or for which readily available, internationally comparable quantified benchmarks may simply not exist or may be difficult to build in an operationally useful way. While recognising the limitations of hard data and the value that can be derived from a well-formulated survey instrument, this approach allows a more comprehensive assessment that includes donors' humanitarian procedures and practices.

It is well known that virtually all of the higher-profile international benchmarking initiatives such as Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*, the World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Index*, the *World Competitiveness Yearbook* of the IMD Business School, and the World Bank's *Investment*

*Climate Assessments* use surveys to build a bridge between difficult-to-quantify but otherwise critically important factors (e.g., property rights, the judicial climate, various dimensions of governance, and the quality of public institutions) and a set of quantified performance indicators.

Second, donor behaviour must be seen in the context of the relationship between the donor, as the institutional principal, and the implementing agency, as the delivering agent. This relationship has been explicitly incorporated in the formulation of the *Principles* and has guided the design of the questionnaire to collect the qualitative data used for the HRI. Finally, although individual donor behaviour cannot be fully separated from collective donor behaviour, the HRI unambiguously focuses on individual donor performance, as reflected in the hard data, and as perceived by implementing agencies in their relationships with individual donors.

### *The Survey*

The qualitative data was collected by interviewing various stakeholders involved in humanitarian activities, guided by a targeted questionnaire (Questionnaire on Good Practice in Humanitarian Donorship, henceforward referred to as the *Survey*). The aim was to record the views or opinions of implementing agencies about how donors active in the agencies' area of operations have fared in relation to the *Principles*, across a representative selection of complex emergencies and natural disasters. In designing the Survey, we endeavoured not to make it overly burdensome for respondents. The questions posed in the Survey may be broadly interpreted as capturing assessment of donor performance at the time the Survey took place.<sup>19</sup> (A full listing of the questions contained in the Survey is contained in the Appendix, at the end of this Report). The wording of the questions reflected closely the spirit of the *Principle* being addressed.

During each field visit, the relevant agencies that were actively working with donors and had received funding from them in that particular crisis were interviewed. The target survey group included national and international NGOs, UN agencies, funds, and programmes, as well as other international organisations active in the field. To ensure that all relevant humanitarian actors were consulted, the field visits were planned in coordination with key stakeholders<sup>20</sup> who could help to initiate a dialogue with agencies in each field location.



The criteria used to select the sample of representative crises involved several dimensions, including the need to have, within the sample, both natural disasters and conflicts, appropriate geographic representation, and adequate donor presence in the crises. It was also thought desirable to have some diversity in terms of the magnitude of the emergencies and a critical volume of donor funding. The crises countries chosen were the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Pakistan, Lebanon, Colombia and Haiti and the surveys were carried out during the period May–July 2007. A pilot study was carried out in Mozambique in April 2007 to test a first draft of the Survey and to ensure a reasonable degree of clarity in its formulation.

The Survey covers a range of topics and is divided into 3 sections that broadly mirror the organisation of the *Principles*:

- Objectives of humanitarian action
- General principles
- Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability
  - (a) Funding
  - (b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation
  - (c) Learning and accountability

Each question has the same structure, asking participants to evaluate donor performance with respect to a particular principle on a scale from 1 to 7. At one end of the scale, 1 typically represents the least favourable possible outcome, and at the other end of the scale, 7 represents the best.

There was a concerted effort to obtain a large sample of survey responses that would provide appropriate coverage across all 23 donors being ranked. While this was not a problem for the majority of countries, there were three countries for which it proved difficult to gather at least 20 responses. Perhaps not surprisingly, small donors with relatively modest budgets in the area of humanitarian assistance operate through a correspondingly smaller number of implementing agencies than more well-established donors. On balance, it was thought better to include these countries in the ranking, particularly given that the HRI has a large number of hard data indicators which provide valuable data on the performance of all donors, and where the size of the donor was not a relevant consideration. Obviously,

future editions of the HRI will endeavour, where possible, to increase the sample size with due regard to the overall quality of the sample. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the 1,021 responses by donor and by type of respondent.

#### *Index formulation and structure*

The HRI attempts to strike a balance between the need for broad coverage of factors explaining donor performance and a reasonable degree of economy as, in principle, there is virtually no limit to the number of variables that could be used to explain donors' humanitarian aid efforts and the extent to which these mirror the GHD *Principles*. The HRI is, thus, a broad and comprehensive assessment of how individual donors are faring relative to the commitments outlined in the *Principles*. In constructing the Index, it was first necessary to identify a number of index categories capturing different aspects of the *Principles*. Each *Principle* was then mapped to a category and the most appropriate quantitative and qualitative indicators capturing donor behaviour with respect to the underlying principle were identified. It was also necessary to determine appropriate weights both for the indicators within categories, as well as for the categories within the index and, finally, to define sensible normalisation mechanisms to aggregate survey and hard data indicators.

### **Box 2. Example of a typical Survey question**

Has the donor provided humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and/or long-term development?

Not at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Always
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- 1: means you agree completely with the answer on the left-hand side
- 2: means you largely agree with the left-hand side
- 3: means you somewhat agree with the left-hand side
- 4: means your opinion is indifferent between the two answers
- 5: means you somewhat agree with the right-hand side
- 6: means you largely agree with the right-hand side
- 7: means you agree completely with the answer on the right-hand side

**Table 1. Humanitarian Response Index 2007:  
Distribution of survey responses by country**

Donor	Total number of responses	Responses from headquarters	Responses from field organisations
Australia	32	8	24
Austria	21	17	4
Belgium	25	5	20
Canada	74	6	68
Denmark	22	12	10
European Commission	185	15	170
Finland	17	11	6
France	31	9	22
Germany	39	9	30
Greece	17	14	3
Ireland	31	5	26
Italy	26	7	19
Japan	33	5	28
Luxembourg	20	10	10
Netherlands	44	5	39
New Zealand	18	7	11
Norway	44	7	37
Portugal	24	21	3
Spain	39	4	35
Sweden	45	7	38
Switzerland	32	5	27
UK	87	10	77
USA	115	4	111
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1021</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>818</b>

The following five categories were chosen:

1. Responding to humanitarian needs
2. Integrating relief and development
3. Working with humanitarian partners
4. Implementing international guiding principles
5. Promoting learning and accountability

Guided by the categories set out in the *Principles*, these groups were chosen to bring together all those principles that deal with broadly similar aspects of humanitarian assistance into various “pillars.” For instance, Principles 3, 4, 16, 19, and 20 highlight the importance of humanitarian action taking place in a manner that is respectful of international humanitarian law and other international protocols and guidelines. They have all been brought into pillar 4 under the heading “Implementing international guiding principles.” It is evident that because the principles sometimes overlap and may, in many cases, encompass elements drawn from

a number of dimensions of humanitarian action, the above categorisation is not unique. There are, indeed, many possible ways to organise the *Principles*.<sup>21</sup> Box 3 presents the structure of the HRI and the distribution of all hard and soft indicators by pillar.

Table 2 shows a detailed list and definitions of the hard data indicators for each of the five pillars of the HRI.

Several remarks are in order:

The HRI contains a total of 57 indicators, 25 of which have been built up as hard data indicators capturing some dimension of the *Principles*, with the rest drawn from the Survey and addressing, likewise, a specific principle.

These indicators are broadly distributed across the *Principles*, but without a rigid formula. Some principles are more amenable to quantification, while others may be more effectively measured through the Survey. Our approach has been pragmatic. Hard data indicators have been developed where possible, when they could be formulated in a way that highlighted some essential dimension of a particular principle, but subject to the requirement that the associated data used to build it were available for all countries being ranked and were internationally comparable.

Quantitative data were collected from a variety of sources such as OCHA-FTS and website, the ECHO 14-point HAC system, the OECD-DAC, the World Bank, UNDP, IFRC, ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, UNRWA, and from individual donors either in donor capitals or at headquarters for operational agencies. Without any doubt, each of these data sources has its own pitfalls, either because it is incomplete (OCHA-FTS), not very current (OECD-DAC), subject to possible bias, and so on. These drawbacks arise mainly from the failure by some donors and their key partners to provide the requisite information. But another challenging problem has been the lack of an internally acceptable definition of humanitarian assistance, which means that donors each have rather different concepts of what constitutes humanitarian aid. This makes comparisons across the board very difficult. In light of these limitations, in estimating the hard data indicators we have not relied exclusively on any one data source but have consulted a variety of sources, including figures provided directly by donors. However, the FTS is currently still the most detailed and timely source of information available on humanitarian aid across the board and therefore can provide a rich source of valuable insights on specific issues pertaining to humanitarian action.



### Box 3. Composition of the Humanitarian Response Index

The detailed structure of the Humanitarian Response Index is provided below. The numbers next to the survey indicators match those used in the questionnaire, shown in Box 1. In a few instances, some survey questions have been combined.<sup>1</sup> A full description and definitions of the hard data indicators is provided in Table 2, shown below.

#### 1st Pillar: Responding to humanitarian needs

##### Survey Indicators

- 1.01 Alleviation of suffering
- 2.01 Impartiality
- 2.02 Neutrality
- 2.03 & 2.04 Independence
- 5.01 Reallocation of funds from other crises
- 5.04 Timely funding
- 6.01 Funding in proportion to need
- 11.01 Commitment to ongoing crises

##### Hard Data Indicators

- 2.01 Distribution of funding relative to historical ties and geographic proximity
- 2.02 Distribution of funding relative to sector, forgotten emergency and media coverage
- 5.01 Funding in cash
- 5.02 Timely funding to complex emergencies
- 5.03 Timely funding to onset disasters
- 6.01 Funding to priority sectors
- 6.02 Distribution of funding relative to ECHO's GNA

#### 2nd Pillar: Integrating relief and development

##### Survey Indicators

- 7.01 Consultation with beneficiaries on design and implementation
- 7.02 Consultation with beneficiaries on monitoring and evaluation
- 1.02 Strengthening preparedness
- 8.01 & 8.02 Strengthening local capacity to deal with crises
- 8.03 Strengthening resilience to cope with crises
- 8.04 Encouraging better coordination with humanitarian partners
- 9.01 Supporting long-term development aims
- 9.02 Supporting rapid recovery of sustainable livelihoods

##### Hard Data Indicators

- 8.01 Funding to strengthen local capacity
- 8.02 Funding to international disaster risk reduction mechanisms

#### 3rd Pillar: Working with humanitarian partners

##### Survey Indicators

- 8.05 Supporting effective coordination efforts
- 10.01 Promoting role of NGOs
- 12.01 Predictability of funding
- 13.01 Reducing earmarking
- 13.02 Flexible funding
- 13.03 Longer-term funding arrangements
- 17.01 Donor preparedness in implementation of humanitarian action
- 17.02 Facilitating safe humanitarian access
- 18.01 & 18.02 Supporting contingency planning and capacity building efforts

##### Hard Data Indicators

- 10.01 Funding UN coordination mechanisms and common services
- 10.02 Funding NGOs
- 10.03 Funding Red Cross Movement
- 12.01 Funding CERF
- 12.02 Predictability of donor funding
- 13.01 Unearmarked or broadly earmarked funds
- 14.01 Funding UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals
- 14.02 Funding IFRC Appeals
- 14.03 Funding ICRC Appeals
- 18.01 Funding quick disbursement mechanisms
- 18.02 Supporting UNDAC

#### 4th Pillar: Implementing international guiding principles

##### Survey Indicators

- 3.01 Engagement in risk mitigation
- 3.02 Enhancing security
- 4.01 Protecting human rights
- 19.01 Affirming primary role of civilian organisations

##### Hard Data Indicators

- 4.01 Implementing international humanitarian law
- 4.02 Implementing human rights law

#### 5th Pillar: Promoting learning and accountability

##### Survey Indicators

- 15.01 Supporting accountability in humanitarian action
- 21.01 & 21.02 Supporting learning and accountability initiatives
- 22.01 Encouraging regular evaluations

##### Hard Data Indicators

- 21.01 Support to main accountability initiatives
- 21.02 Funding of other accountability initiatives
- 22.01 Number of evaluations

<sup>1</sup> For instance, survey questions 8.01 and 8.02, addressing the issue of whether the donor has strengthened the capacity of the government and the local communities, respectively, to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to humanitarian crises have been combined, meaning responses have been averaged across both questions and a single score used for each donor.

**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators****PILLAR 1: RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS*****H2.01 Distribution of funding to recipient countries relative to historical ties and geographic proximity with recipient country***

Principle 2 calls for the implementation of humanitarian action that is humane, impartial, “solely on the basis of need” and independent from “political, economic, military or other objectives.” Despite commitment to these humanitarian principles, international humanitarian financing is considered not to be equitable, with amounts allocated across various emergencies that do not reflect comparative levels of need. Donors are often motivated to intervene in a given crisis for reasons that do not necessarily match this Principles, for example, due to historical links and/or geographic proximity. Underlying this reality is the fact that there is no system-wide framework for adequately judging the relative severity of situations through global needs assessment and for prioritising response accordingly.<sup>1</sup> In the absence of an internationally accepted benchmark against which to measure outcomes, this indicator is based on an analysis of possible motives which donors may have in delivering humanitarian aid. Therefore, in order to proxy the adherence to concepts of impartiality and independence, a mapping of 23 donors against 113 recipient countries assesses whether the donor country enjoys strong historical links with the recipient country and whether it is within close geographic proximity. The more independent the distribution of total donor funding to recipient countries is from historical links or issues of geographic proximity, the higher the score attributed to the individual donor. There is no presumption, for example, that a donor country should not fund a former colony. Rather, the indicator assesses whether the *preponderance* of donor funding is allocated to countries with which the donor has strong historical or geographic links, adjusting for the number of such ties/links, and allocating scores across donors in a way that gives higher credit to countries who are less swayed in their funding decisions by such considerations.

***H2.02 Distribution of funding to emergencies relative to degree of media coverage, sector to which funding is allocated, and whether emergency is classified as forgotten***

This indicator captures the same dimensions of Principle 2 in a different way. Since donor funding should fundamentally be guided by considerations of need, this indicator rewards donors whose humanitarian interventions are not biased against forgotten emergencies, are reasonably independent from extensive media coverage, and are not unduly focused on a few media-intense sectors, such as food and health. The indicator considers 329 emergencies in 2005 and 2006 and classifies donor funding by CAP sector, by the extent of media coverage each emergency receives, and by whether the emergency in question has been classified as “forgotten,” both based on the IFRC’s *World Disasters Report 2006* methodology.<sup>2</sup> The indicator allocates higher scores to donors whose funding decisions are less swayed by media attention to particular emergencies, are not biased in favour of the high-profile food and health sectors, and pay due regard to forgotten emergencies.

***H5.01 Percentage of total HA provided in cash***

Principle 5 calls on donors to “strive to ensure flexible and timely funding” to meet humanitarian needs. While this concept has a number of dimensions, this indicator calculates the share of total humanitarian assistance which the donor provided in cash, as reported by the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).<sup>3</sup> The emphasis here is on the “flexible” component of this principle; cash as opposed to tied or rigidly earmarked aid unambiguously adds flexibility to funding.

***H5.02 Funds within an Appeal committed or disbursed to complex emergencies in first quarter after Appeal date, as percentage of total funds within an Appeal committed to those crises during year***

The timely delivery of resources in the event of a humanitarian crisis is strongly supported by the *Principles*. Indicator H5.02 calculates funds within a CAP committed or disbursed to complex emergencies in the first quarter after the Appeal date as a percentage of total funds within the Appeal committed or disbursed to those crises during the period 2005–2006. It is taken as a proxy for the timely delivery of funds to such crises.

*(Cont'd.)*

**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)**

<b>PILLAR 1: RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS (Cont'd.)</b>	
<i>H5.03 Funds committed to individual onset of disasters disbursed to complex emergencies in first quarter after Appeal date, as percentage of total funds within an Appeal committed to those crises during year</i>	Indicator H5.03 is different from H5.02 only to the extent that the indicator applies to onset disasters (as opposed to complex emergencies) up to six months after onset and also captures funding outside a CAP.
<i>H6.01 Funds (inside and outside Appeals) committed to priority sectors (identified for each emergency by means of the CAPs) as a percentage of total funding to those emergencies</i>	Principle 6 calls on donors to “allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.” Notwithstanding the lack of a widely-accepted methodology for assessing global humanitarian needs, as alluded to earlier in the related discussion of Principle 2, this indicator is based on UN needs assessment methodology—albeit imperfect—to capture the proportion of total funding, inside and outside an Appeal, to emergencies with CAPs, that is directed to those priority sectors identified by the CAPs for each emergency. It is a proxy for donor readiness to respond on the basis of needs defined by the UN, as reflected in the share of funding going to identified priority sectors.
<i>H6.02 Distribution of donor funding relative to ECHO's 2006 Vulnerability Index/GNA</i>	<p>This indicator builds on ECHO's 2006 global needs and vulnerability assessment (GNA)<sup>4</sup> which identifies the most vulnerable countries as those most in need of humanitarian assistance. The GNA is an existing needs assessment methodology, which is also regarded as subject to pitfalls, similar to the UN needs assessment described above. The GNA indicators include human development and poverty indicators, health of children, malnutrition, mortality, access to health care, prevalence of HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, the gender-specific human development and Gini Indices, and crisis indicators such as ongoing or recently resolved conflicts, recent natural disasters and the extent of population movements.</p> <p>This indicator maps donor funding to over 100 recipient countries according to the GNA's vulnerability scores and crisis index and rewards donors whose humanitarian assistance is allocated to the most needy and vulnerable countries identified.</p>
<b>PILLAR 2: INTEGRATING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	
<i>H8.01 Funding to strengthen capacity of countries and local communities as a percentage of total Official Development Assistance (ODA)</i>	Integrating relief and development is considered to be essential for ensuring that outcomes initiated during a humanitarian intervention are sustainable. It is clear that the returns to investment in humanitarian assistance will be higher where long-term development issues have been addressed in a comprehensive manner during the emergency phase. However, donors often lack mechanisms for funding recovery and reconstruction work. Donors without bilateral ongoing programmes are more likely to abandon the country once the crisis is deemed to have passed. H8.01 captures a donor's commitment to local capacity building, by looking at the ratio of donor funding to projects aimed at strengthening capacity-building activities for local NGOs and local institutions engaged in humanitarian activities (as reported in OCHA/FTS) in relation to ODA. <sup>5</sup>
<i>H8.02 Funding to UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the IFRC's disaster management activities, to the World Bank/ISDR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery and to ProVention as a percentage of total ODA</i>	This indicator captures donor commitment to disaster risk reduction and crisis prevention, focusing on the biggest multilateral mechanisms available to fund disaster risk reduction and prevention projects. The indicator includes donor financing of the UNDP's Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (2004-2005), the World Bank's Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (2007), IFRC's disaster management activities (2005-2006) and ProVention (2005-2006) as a percentage of total ODA.

(Cont'd.)

**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)**

<b>PILLAR 3: WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS</b>	
<b><i>H10.01 Funding to UN coordination mechanisms and common services ("coordination and support services") as a percentage of requirements</i></b>	Principle 10 addresses aspects of the relationship between the donor and the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organisations. Donors recognise the critical role played by these three players in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and are, therefore, called upon to maintain a balanced selection of partners between UN, NGO and the Red Cross Movement, based on their competence and capacity. Grounded in the collective indicators, indicator H10.01 recognises the leading role of the UN agencies in humanitarian action, particularly in the light of the new approaches to sector coordination, by capturing funding to the United Nations coordination mechanisms and common services as a share of total requirements, using a fair share criterion which takes into account the share of an individual donor's GDP in total DAC GDP in allocating scores across donors. Funding amounts are defined as those contributed to "coordination and support services" inside UN CAPs.
<b><i>H10.02 Funding to NGOs as percentage of total HA and restrictiveness of relationship</i></b>	Acknowledging the important role NGOs play in delivering humanitarian aid, donor support to, and recognition of, this key role is measured in this indicator by donor funding to NGOs in relation to total humanitarian assistance in 2005 and 2006. In addition, this indicator rewards those donors which can fund foreign NGOs, instead of being restricted to funding only NGOs of their own nationality. <sup>6</sup>
<b><i>H10.03 Funding to Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as percentage of total HA</i></b>	This indicator measures funding to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) similar to that for the funding to NGOs (H10.02) above. <sup>7</sup> Total funding as a share of total humanitarian assistance in 2005 and 2006 is calculated and scores are allocated accordingly.
<b><i>H12.01 Funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) based on fair share</i></b>	Principle 12 is derived from donor concern for the need to develop good practices in donor financing and management of financial resources. Specifically, it addresses the issue of the desirability of ensuring flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, so as to "ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, with the objectives of promoting early action and response to reduce loss of life." <sup>8</sup> Indicator H12.01 takes funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and allocates scores using a fair share concept based on total DAC GDP.
<b><i>H12.02 Predictability of donor funding to key humanitarian partners over the last five years</i></b>	Based on Principle 12, this indicator deals with the predictability of funding to key humanitarian partners. The indicator encompasses the number of times a donor has allocated funding to each of the 144 organisations involved in the delivery of humanitarian action, over the period 2002–2006. Donors which have funded their partners in each of the five years will receive higher scores than donors whose funding has been sporadic and less predictable.
<b><i>H13.01 Percentage of unearmarked or broadly earmarked funds (inside and outside Appeals) out of total humanitarian assistance</i></b>	Principle 13 calls upon donors to "enhance the flexibility of earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements." This indicator gives credit to donors which provide a greater share of their humanitarian assistance in unearmarked or broadly earmarked form during the period 2004–2006.

*(Cont'd.)*

**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)**

<b>PILLAR 3: WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS (Cont'd.)</b>	
<b>H14.01 Funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals as fair share</b>	Principle 14 encourages donors to respond to Appeals of the United Nations and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, giving them a leading role in responding to humanitarian emergencies. The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals Process (CAPs), identifies the funding needs of the crises they apply to. This indicator calculates donor funding to the 2006 CAPs as a proportion of total needs. In estimating donor scores, we use a fair share concept which takes into account the share of an individual donor's GDP in total DAC GDP, in keeping with Principle 14's reference to the equitable burden sharing considerations in determining the size of contributions.
<b>H14.02 Funding to IFRC Annual and Emergency Appeals as percentage of needs met for these Appeals as fair share</b>	The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement—consisting of the IFRC, the ICRC and Red Cross national societies—have their own annual Appeals process. This indicator captures the funds directed to IFRC Appeals, both annual and emergency, in 2005 and 2006 as a share of total needs. As with the previous indicator, a fair share criterion is used in allocating scores to individual donors.
<b>H14.03 Funding to ICRC Annual and Emergency Appeals as percentage of total funding as fair share</b>	This indicator calculates funding to the ICRC Annual and Emergency Appeals as a percentage of total funding in 2005 and 2006 using the fair share concept used in H14.01 and H14.02.
<b>H18.01 Funding to quick disbursement mechanisms as fair share</b>	Underlying this indicator is the need to allocate funding to strengthen capacities for response. This indicator aggregates donor funding to the main mechanisms—other than the CERF—for committing funding under flexible terms, using a fair share criterion. Unlike the CERF, these mechanisms allow funds to be disbursed to key humanitarian organisations more widely than to only UN agencies, funds, and programmes, and enable the Humanitarian Coordinators to act independently and robustly in support of humanitarian objectives. The funds considered for this indicator are: the IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund, the Common Humanitarian Funds piloted in Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, Emergency Response Funds in 2006 for the DRC, Indonesia, Somalia, the Republic of Congo and Ethiopia and country Humanitarian Response Funds in 2005 for North Korea (DPRK), the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, and Somalia.
<b>H18.02 Funding to and operations of UNDAC</b>	Principle 18 encourages donors to support initiatives and mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations. In line with General Assembly Resolution 46/182, the United Nations established a central registry of all specialised personnel and teams of technical specialists—as well as relief supplies, equipment and services from governments, among others—which can be called upon at short notice. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team is a stand-by group of disaster management professionals, nominated and funded, among others, by member governments, who can be deployed within hours to carry out rapid assessment of priority needs and to support coordination efforts. The indicator captures several dimensions of donor support to the UNDAC mechanism, including financial contributions made by donors to the costs of its operations, the availability on short notice and presence of donor country representatives in UNDAC teams, as well as their in-kind support.

*(Cont'd.)*

**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)****PILLAR 4: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

***H4.01 Acceptance to be bound by principal legal instruments on International Humanitarian Law (IHL), existence of national commissions on domestic implementation of IHL and in specific case of Rome Statute, whether domestic laws are enacted or in draft stage***

Principle 4 calls for donors to “respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.” Indicator H4.01 captures three dimensions of implementation. First, from a total of 24 key international humanitarian law treaties,<sup>9</sup> it registers the total number actually ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to by individual donor countries. Beyond this, implementation requires that states adopt a number of internal laws and regulations and spread knowledge of the relevant Conventions and Protocols as widely as possible. The indicator gives additional credit to countries that have created national committees aimed at ensuring effective application of IHL, as advocated by the ICRC.<sup>10</sup> Finally, in the specific case of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, it gives credit to donor countries depending on whether domestic laws have been enacted or are in draft stage, based on information collected by Amnesty International.

***H4.02 Acceptance to be bound by principal legal instruments on human rights, including seven core instruments and their additional protocols***

This indicator gives credit to donors in proportion to the number of principal legal instruments on human rights and their additional protocols they have ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

**PILLAR 5: PROMOTING LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

***H21.01 Membership, attendance, and support of key accountability initiatives***

Principle 21 commits donors to “support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.” A number of initiatives exist, including the Sphere Project and the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), aimed at defining standards for field level action. Others aim to improve the overall management (Quality COMPAS), or the human resources (People in Aid) of organisations. ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) has a unique role in promoting evaluation and learning from experience as a tool to improve overall performance of agencies and donors. The indicator seeks to measure donor support for and commitment to these initiatives by capturing various dimensions of their participation. In the case of ALNAP, membership in, and attendance to biannual meetings are considered key factors in evaluating support. The indicator assigns different weights to each initiative, reflecting their relative importance in terms of impact on humanitarian action to date, with ALNAP and Sphere accounting for 70 percent of the total weight.

***H21.02 Funding of other accountability and learning initiatives and projects***

This indicator measures support to learning and accountability initiatives by means of funding assigned to ALNAP and HAP, as well as to those projects that support learning and accountability and are listed in OCHA/FTS for the years 2005 and 2006.<sup>11</sup> The scores are calculated in relation to total humanitarian assistance funding.

*(Cont'd.)*



**Table 2. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)****PILLAR 5: PROMOTING LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Cont'd.)****H22.01 Number of self and joint evaluations of learning initiatives and projects**

Principle 22 encourages donors to make “regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.” Evaluations assess humanitarian interventions according to defined criteria such as relevance, efficiency, and impact, and are useful to assess lessons learned to enhance the effectiveness of future donor interventions. Donors can evaluate their own performance, commission evaluations of activities carried out by organisations funded by them or engage with other agencies and donors in joint exercises. This indicator counts the number of publicly available individual evaluations carried out or funded by donors in the last three years (2004–2006). It also includes a measure of joint evaluations, given their broader scope. The indicator also takes into consideration the existence of evaluation guidelines, viewed as another means of promoting the practice of evaluations.

1 See Darcy and Hofman, 2003 and Willitts-King, 2007.

2 See Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in the IFRC report. Neglected crises were defined on the basis of the following methodologies: Reuters/AlertNet; Médecins sans Frontières, 2007; ECHO; and United Nations News Service. The extent of media coverage was based on the media tracking methodology developed by Reuters/AlertNet, detailed at <http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/chart/mediamonitoringmethodology.htm>

3 The value of in-kind contributions continues to be a problematic issue. In the absence of a rigorous methodology applied by all donors for calculating this, we used the values entered in the FTS. However, for three donors, some in-kind contributions were entered with a zero value, leading to a possible minor overestimate of those donors' cash contributions for this particular indicator.

4 See links for European Commission Humanitarian (Aid) Office (ECHO).

5 Search terms used were Capacity building, Local capacity, Local community, Recovery, Prevention, Preparedness, Linking relief rehabilitation development, Coordinate, Strengthen response capacity, Reconstruction, Planning mitigation, and Contingency planning, in order to identify projects funded by donors whose main focus was to build local capacity in the sense of Principle 8.

6 These data were provided directly by donors in the context of visits to donor capitals by research teams.

7 Currently, the IFRC does not systematically collect data covering the amounts of official funding to respective national Red Cross societies based in donor countries. It was therefore not possible to apportion the share of official funding within the contributions that the IFRC receives from national societies, which amount to approximately US\$900 million. In addition, it also does not capture donors' contributions to national Red Cross societies that are channelled as bilateral flows from one national society to another and completely bypass the Federation. Our figures for donor funding to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement therefore underestimate donors' commitment.

8 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/124 of 15 December 2005, 63rd plenary meeting.

9 The principal legal instruments on international humanitarian law are listed in the European Union guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (European Union, 2005).

10 See ICRC (1997) Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: 1) Implementing International Humanitarian Law: from law to action, and 2) national Committees for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law.

11 Using search terms: Learning and accountability, and evaluation, to identify relevant projects funded by donors.

In this respect, we have followed the approach of Development Initiatives (DI) in its *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2006* report, which relies heavily on this source of information to calculate certain indicators for which other sources of data are not available.

It is important to emphasise that the HRI rankings reflect both relative scores on the Survey *and* the hard data indicators and that these, in turn, do not depend on a single data source, such as FTS. Indeed, the advantages of an index such as the HRI compiled on the basis of 57 indicators, means that final rankings will not unduly depend on the fact that for a given country a particular hard data indicator may suffer from reliance on a data source which, in 2007, is less than perfect in its coverage. Our aim has been to use the best data *currently* available, while endeavouring to ensure that data deficiencies, where they exist, do not unfairly penalise one country more than others. Of course, it is to be hoped that with the rising importance of humanitarian assistance, efforts currently underway to improve the timeliness and coverage of existing data sources will be further strengthened.

With one exception, within each pillar all indicators have equal weight, both as regards those drawn from the Survey and those using hard data.<sup>22</sup> We did take a view as to the relative importance of the individual pillars (see below), but we found no strong theoretical or empirical reason to attribute different weights to particular indicators.

The index does not weigh all 5 pillars equally, on the grounds that, *a priori*, some principles are seen by the humanitarian community to be more important than others. This applies particularly to those principles allocated to the first pillar which capture various dimensions of a needs-based response. Nevertheless, it should be stated unequivocally that the determination of weights is not a scientific process, but is based on consultation with stakeholders.<sup>23</sup> Table 3 below shows the distribution of weights across the five pillars as used in the calculation of the HRI.

#### IV. Rankings and analysis

The rankings from the Humanitarian Response Index 2007 are presented in Tables 4 through 7. In the pages that follow we analyse the performance of a number of countries, including, in some detail, that of Sweden, this year's top performer. There is no attempt to be comprehensive in our choice of countries discussed; rather, we

**Table 3. Weighting of pillars in Humanitarian Response Index**

Pillar	Weight (%)
Responding to humanitarian needs	30
Integrating relief and development	20
Working with humanitarian partners	20
Implementing international guiding principles	15
Promoting learning and accountability	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 4. Humanitarian Response Index rankings 2007**

Donor	HRI rankings	HRI scores
Sweden	1	5.37
Norway	2	5.13
Denmark	3	5.01
Netherlands	4	5.01
European Commission	5	4.91
Ireland	6	4.86
Canada	7	4.80
New Zealand	8	4.80
United Kingdom	9	4.76
Switzerland	10	4.68
Finland	11	4.58
Luxembourg	12	4.51
Germany	13	4.45
Australia	14	4.44
Belgium	15	4.42
United States	16	4.39
Spain	17	4.29
Japan	18	4.19
France	19	4.06
Austria	20	4.01
Portugal	21	3.95
Italy	22	3.87
Greece	23	3.17

have chosen a group which, in our view, illustrates some particularly interesting dimension of humanitarian action. Tables 5 through 7 provide a detailed presentation of the index results and, in addition, the donor profiles at the end of this Report provide valuable additional information about individual donor performance.

Table 5. Humanitarian Response Index 2007

Donor	PILLARS											
	OVERALL INDEX		Responding to humanitarian needs		Integrating relief and development		Working with humanitarian partners		Implementing international guiding principles		Promoting learning and accountability	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Sweden	1	5.37	4	5.35	7	4.47	1	5.91	1	6.12	3	5.15
Norway	2	5.13	1	5.50	3	4.72	2	5.27	3	5.79	14	4.11
Denmark	3	5.01	2	5.47	5	4.67	7	4.17	4	5.75	5	4.96
Netherlands	4	5.01	5	5.34	11	4.35	3	5.15	11	5.40	7	4.65
European Commission	5	4.91	18	4.86	2	4.77	8	4.12	8	5.44	1	5.74
Ireland	6	4.86	3	5.37	4	4.68	5	4.38	16	5.09	11	4.46
Canada	7	4.80	8	5.14	6	4.55	11	3.76	5	5.70	6	4.96
New Zealand	8	4.80	9	5.12	1	5.00	12	3.53	2	5.86	9	4.50
United Kingdom	9	4.76	11	5.07	13	4.25	4	4.44	18	5.04	4	4.99
Switzerland	10	4.68	13	4.98	8	4.43	9	4.11	14	5.34	10	4.49
Finland	11	4.58	10	5.11	19	3.93	10	3.87	13	5.39	8	4.53
Luxembourg	12	4.51	6	5.23	16	4.14	6	4.29	19	5.01	19	3.36
Germany	13	4.45	12	4.99	17	4.12	15	3.37	9	5.42	12	4.25
Australia	14	4.44	17	4.86	9	4.38	14	3.42	15	5.23	13	4.23
Belgium	15	4.42	14	4.95	12	4.27	16	3.36	7	5.60	17	3.80
United States	16	4.39	16	4.91	10	4.37	13	3.43	23	3.83	2	5.22
Spain	17	4.29	15	4.93	15	4.15	17	3.12	6	5.67	18	3.40
Japan	18	4.19	7	5.23	18	4.02	21	2.55	21	4.70	15	4.04
France	19	4.06	21	4.48	22	3.48	18	3.06	10	5.41	16	3.97
Austria	20	4.01	20	4.63	21	3.62	19	3.02	12	5.40	20	3.20
Portugal	21	3.95	19	4.71	14	4.16	22	2.48	17	5.07	22	2.98
Italy	22	3.87	22	4.46	20	3.88	20	2.84	20	4.82	21	3.08
Greece	23	3.17	23	3.43	23	3.16	23	2.17	22	4.68	23	2.44

Table 6. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Good Practice in Humanitarian Donorship Survey

PILLAR 1: RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS								
Donor	Alleviation of suffering	Impartiality	Neutrality	Independence	Reallocation of funds from other crises	Timely funding	Funding in proportion to need	Commitment to ongoing crises
Australia	20	19	21	21	6	6	18	9
Austria	19	17	10	14	21	10	21	18
Belgium	14	3	4	12	18	18	13	7
Canada	10	9	15	10	9	12	9	8
Denmark	5	10	7	13	11	1	15	15
European Commission	13	15	17	16	22	16	5	6
Finland	12	12	14	9	8	15	21	23
France	22	22	22	22	13	20	11	1
Germany	8	13	9	7	16	14	6	19
Greece	23	23	20	19	17	23	23	21
Ireland	8	14	5	1	1	7	17	14
Italy	17	18	18	17	10	22	4	11
Japan	16	6	12	6	20	19	16	17
Luxembourg	3	5	8	4	18	8	14	3
Netherlands	7	4	16	15	4	11	8	16
New Zealand	1	1	3	2	2	2	3	5
Norway	5	8	11	8	7	4	2	4
Portugal	21	20	13	20	23	21	20	22
Spain	11	11	2	5	15	17	1	2
Sweden	2	7	6	11	5	5	10	12
Switzerland	4	2	1	3	3	3	19	10
United Kingdom	15	16	19	18	14	9	7	13
United States	18	21	23	23	12	13	12	20

PILLAR 2: INTEGRATING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT								
Donor	Consultation with beneficiaries on design and implementation	Consultation with beneficiaries on monitoring and evaluation	Strengthening preparedness	Strengthening local capacity to deal with crises	Strengthening resilience to cope with crises	Encouraging better coordination with humanitarian partners	Supporting long-term development aims	Supporting rapid recovery of sustainable livelihoods
Australia	17	17	13	1	1	3	8	14
Austria	19	22	20	11	16	9	22	22
Belgium	2	6	1	18	13	20	11	3
Canada	10	3	2	4	17	6	4	15
Denmark	3	11	6	2	2	5	3	5
European Commission	13	4	5	7	8	8	10	10
Finland	11	18	22	13	19	22	20	16
France	22	20	15	21	22	17	17	21
Germany	12	7	11	14	17	16	21	18
Greece	21	23	23	23	23	23	23	23
Ireland	18	5	8	19	11	19	8	13
Italy	20	15	19	22	21	11	13	20
Japan	7	19	17	20	20	18	19	19
Luxembourg	9	16	16	17	9	21	18	4
Netherlands	5	9	7	5	14	15	14	7
New Zealand	1	21	21	2	4	1	1	1
Norway	6	10	12	12	6	4	2	6
Portugal	23	1	3	10	5	14	16	16
Spain	4	8	9	9	10	12	6	8
Sweden	14	14	10	6	12	2	15	9
Switzerland	8	12	17	8	3	10	5	11
United Kingdom	16	13	14	15	15	13	12	12
United States	15	2	4	14	7	7	7	2

**Table 6. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Good Practice in Humanitarian Donorship Survey (cont'd.)**

PILLAR 3: WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS										
Donor	Supporting effective coordination efforts	Promoting role of NGOs	Predictability of funding	Reducing earmarking	Flexible funding	Longer-term funding arrangements	Donor preparedness in implementation of humanitarian action	Facilitating safe humanitarian access	Supporting contingency planning and capacity building efforts	
Australia	17	15	15	11	12	7	8	1	12	
Austria	18	16	20	21	20	21	16	20	21	
Belgium	2	20	3	14	16	8	21	11	4	
Canada	10	12	9	16	17	13	6	14	13	
Denmark	6	1	5	4	5	1	2	13	6	
European Commission	4	4	6	22	19	10	5	8	15	
Finland	5	18	21	10	3	18	18	21	11	
France	21	17	16	19	18	17	15	17	19	
Germany	14	5	7	15	15	15	10	12	17	
Greece	23	22	23	20	22	23	23	23	23	
Ireland	15	13	8	8	4	2	14	18	10	
Italy	19	10	18	9	5	20	20	16	18	
Japan	20	21	19	23	23	19	19	22	20	
Luxembourg	16	19	17	6	2	3	13	2	3	
Netherlands	3	9	2	7	8	14	17	7	1	
New Zealand	7	6	11	2	1	4	12	9	14	
Norway	9	6	14	3	8	9	7	3	16	
Portugal	22	23	22	18	21	22	22	4	22	
Spain	12	3	13	13	13	6	11	19	9	
Sweden	1	11	1	1	11	11	1	9	2	
Switzerland	8	2	12	5	7	16	4	15	7	
United Kingdom	11	14	4	12	10	5	9	5	5	
United States	13	8	10	17	14	12	3	6	8	

PILLAR 4: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES				
Donor	Engagement in risk mitigation	Enhancing security	Protecting human rights	Affirming primary role of civilian organisations
Australia	6	2	21	21
Austria	18	21	15	19
Belgium	10	12	6	14
Canada	11	8	8	5
Denmark	5	6	4	11
European Commission	8	7	11	9
Finland	14	15	16	6
France	21	20	19	17
Germany	13	17	12	4
Greece	23	22	23	20
Ireland	16	11	9	15
Italy	22	23	22	22
Japan	15	19	20	8
Luxembourg	19	14	14	1
Netherlands	4	10	10	7
New Zealand	1	1	2	3
Norway	7	3	4	13
Portugal	17	16	6	23
Spain	20	8	13	12
Sweden	2	4	3	2
Switzerland	3	5	1	10
United Kingdom	12	18	18	16
United States	9	13	17	18

PILLAR 5: PROMOTING LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY			
Donor	Supporting accountability in humanitarian action	Supporting learning and accountability initiatives	Encouraging regular evaluations
Australia	17	8	12
Austria	15	21	18
Belgium	13	2	2
Canada	5	12	8
Denmark	4	3	3
European Commission	2	9	1
Finland	9	14	6
France	18	20	19
Germany	3	17	11
Greece	23	23	23
Ireland	19	11	13
Italy	13	19	22
Japan	9	18	20
Luxembourg	20	13	7
Netherlands	6	7	10
New Zealand	11	5	5
Norway	12	16	15
Portugal	16	22	21
Spain	21	15	17
Sweden	8	1	13
Switzerland	22	6	16
United Kingdom	6	4	9
United States	1	10	4

Table 7. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators

PILLAR 1: RESPONDING TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS								
Donor	Distribution of funding relative to historical ties and geographic proximity	Distribution of funding relative to sector, forgotten emergency and media coverage	Funding in cash	Timely funding to complex emergencies	Timely funding to onset disasters	Funding to priority sectors	Distribution of funding relative to ECHO's GNA	
Australia	6	21	17	8	6	18	19	
Austria	19	16	19	23	3	16	4	
Belgium	22	7	9	17	10	14	3	
Canada	2	18	16	16	16	4	12	
Denmark	10	6	2	3	4	20	5	
European Commission	n/a	8	12	9	22	12	14	
Finland	9	12	6	14	17	7	7	
France	20	19	20	12	5	10	17	
Germany	15	11	14	20	7	13	13	
Greece	18	23	23	22	23	11	20	
Ireland	14	10	4	2	21	8	10	
Italy	17	14	15	19	20	19	21	
Japan	3	20	13	11	2	3	6	
Luxembourg	8	13	11	10	8	15	16	
Netherlands	12	4	7	7	13	9	9	
New Zealand	7	22	8	21	18	2	15	
Norway	11	5	5	4	9	17	8	
Portugal	4	15	21	6	1	1	23	
Spain	16	3	18	15	11	22	18	
Sweden	13	1	1	1	12	23	11	
Switzerland	5	2	3	18	19	21	22	
United Kingdom	21	9	10	5	15	5	1	
United States	1	17	22	13	14	6	2	

PILLAR 2: INTEGRATING RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT		
Donor	Funding to strengthen local capacity	Funding to international disaster risk reduction mechanisms
Australia	11	11
Austria	22	21
Belgium	9	19
Canada	18	3
Denmark	7	4
European Commission	3	n/a
Finland	13	16
France	23	20
Germany	16	13
Greece	20	22
Ireland	1	8
Italy	19	9
Japan	17	5
Luxembourg	5	18
Netherlands	12	12
New Zealand	8	1
Norway	4	2
Portugal	14	10
Spain	21	17
Sweden	6	6
Switzerland	2	14
United Kingdom	15	7
United States	10	15




**Table 7. Humanitarian Response Index 2007: Hard data indicators (cont'd.)**

PILLAR 3: WORKING WITH HUMANITARIAN PARTNERS												
Donor	Funding UN coordination mechanisms and common services	Funding to NGOs	Funding Red Cross Movement	Funding CERF	Predictability of funding	Unearmarked or broadly earmarked funds	Funding UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals	Funding IFRC Appeals	Funding ICRC Appeals	Funding quick disbursement mechanisms	Supporting UNDAC	
Australia	12	19	7	11	9	11	14	11	13	10	6	
Austria	21	12	7	19	21	3	22	16	16	10	12	
Belgium	13	19	1	13	15	18	9	14	9	6	16	
Canada	11	15	1	9	5	5	10	7	12	7	9	
Denmark	7	6	7	6	13	2	6	6	7	8	10	
European Commission	n/a	1	7	n/a	1	23	11	13	11	n/a	n/a	
Finland	5	19	1	8	15	9	8	4	6	10	11	
France	20	7	7	17	17	13	18	22	19	10	17	
Germany	19	1	7	19	11	21	19	20	17	10	8	
Greece	21	19	19	18	22	19	21	19	22	10	19	
Ireland	3	1	7	5	8	14	5	3	10	5	19	
Italy	17	15	19	19	13	15	20	17	21	10	15	
Japan	15	19	19	14	9	17	17	15	23	10	14	
Luxembourg	8	7	7	1	20	10	1	10	1	10	19	
Netherlands	4	7	1	4	6	1	3	5	4	1	5	
New Zealand	6	12	7	19	17	16	16	8	15	10	13	
Norway	1	7	7	1	7	4	4	1	5	1	3	
Portugal	16	14	19	15	23	20	23	23	20	10	18	
Spain	18	15	7	12	19	12	15	21	18	10	19	
Sweden	1	1	1	1	4	7	1	1	1	1	1	
Switzerland	10	15	1	10	11	8	12	12	1	9	2	
United Kingdom	9	7	7	7	2	6	7	9	8	1	4	
United States	14	1	19	16	3	22	13	18	14	10	7	

PILLAR 4: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES		
Donor	Implementing international humanitarian law	Implementing human rights law
Australia	9	12
Austria	5	3
Belgium	9	3
Canada	5	3
Denmark	2	3
European Commission	n/a	n/a
Finland	5	12
France	2	3
Germany	5	12
Greece	16	12
Ireland	16	12
Italy	19	3
Japan	20	19
Luxembourg	21	12
Netherlands	13	12
New Zealand	13	3
Norway	2	3
Portugal	16	3
Spain	13	1
Sweden	1	1
Switzerland	9	19
United Kingdom	9	19
United States	22	22

PILLAR 5: PROMOTING LEARNING AND ACCOUNTABILITY			
Donor	Support to main accountability initiatives	Funding of other accountability initiatives	Number of evaluations
Australia	4	15	14
Austria	20	18	18
Belgium	12	13	20
Canada	10	12	3
Denmark	9	11	5
European Commission	1	8	1
Finland	13	1	16
France	15	4	13
Germany	16	10	7
Greece	20	18	20
Ireland	2	7	10
Italy	18	18	20
Japan	17	3	12
Luxembourg	20	18	17
Netherlands	7	6	8
New Zealand	13	1	19
Norway	11	17	10
Portugal	18	18	20
Spain	20	18	15
Sweden	6	5	5
Switzerland	2	9	9
United Kingdom	4	14	4
United States	7	16	2

**Figure 1. Humanitarian Response Index: Hard data indicators versus survey data**



The HRI country results show a strong correlation between hard and soft data indices, suggesting that the results from both reinforce each other, thereby boosting some of the conclusions that can be drawn at the country level (Figure 1).

### Country Profiles

#### Sweden<sup>24</sup>

Sweden is the best-ranking donor in the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2007. Its outstanding performance is backed by both hard and soft data variables. It receives the highest score in the hard data index (5.51) and shares second place with Denmark (5.28) in the soft data index.

Sweden scores well across all five pillars, ranking first in the areas “Working with humanitarian partners” and “Implementing international guiding principles.” Sweden occupies the top place in nineteen variables of the 57 variables used to construct the Index, roughly for a third of all the indicators. It receives its lowest pillar score in the area “Integrating relief and development,” where it comes seventh among the 23 donors ranked.

Within the first pillar, “Responding to humanitarian needs,” often referred to as the “heart” of the GHD and the pillar which attracts the highest weighting in the HRI, Sweden’s strong ranking (4)<sup>26</sup> comes from a distribution of funding that is more focused on forgotten emergencies and on those sectors that typically receive low-profile media coverage than any other donor. This focus on forgotten emergencies appears to rest, at least in part, on its informal policy to fund all UN consolidated Appeals unless these are already well-funded, thereby reaching those crises otherwise forgotten to the world. To ensure the availability of funds for humanitarian contingencies, it caps spending on humanitarian aid within the first six months of the year at 80 percent of the available budget. It also operates a policy of transfer of funds for humanitarian action from non-humanitarian budget lines toward the end of a given year.

Equally, Sweden excels in providing the vast majority of its humanitarian assistance in the form of cash and in responding in a timely manner to complex emergencies, providing the bulk (74 percent) of its humanitarian assistance to emergencies within the first three months of their Appeal launch dates. This very favourable view of Sweden’s success in responding to humanitarian needs strongly confirms findings in its OECD Peer

Review (2005), to the effect that Sweden is perceived as a timely provider of flexible funding.<sup>25</sup> Its ability to deliver on its commitment to the basic principles of humanitarian action is further boosted by their incorporation into its humanitarian aid policy, which reflects the GHD.

In the third pillar, “Working with humanitarian partners,” which encompasses those GHD *Principles* that govern the relationship between donors and the partners they support to implement humanitarian action, Sweden unambiguously establishes itself as the foremost multilateralist in humanitarian action. According to the views of humanitarian actors in the field compiled as the soft data index, Sweden surpasses all other donors in supporting and facilitating coordination efforts and in its ability to support the implementation of humanitarian action at short notice. While Sweden does not delegate humanitarian aid to its field missions, it relies on a network of regional humanitarian coordinators to assess needs, and to monitor and follow up on its humanitarian aid portfolio. This includes close interaction with OCHA and assisting to determine needs.

In the hard data indicators, Sweden’s rankings show that it has thrown its full weight behind the UN and the Red Cross Movement, proving to be among the most generous donors of the OECD-DAC group in this pillar, relative to its income. It receives top marks for funding UN coordination mechanisms and common services, the CERF, the UN, IFRC, and ICRC Appeals, and other quick disbursement mechanisms (including to pooled funds in Sudan and DRC) and for its cash and in-kind support to UNDAC.

In this context, Sweden stands out for providing predictable funding (4) to its multilateral partners, confirmed by its OECD Peer Review that reports the availability of multi-year funding arrangements that can span up to three years, subject to annual parliamentary approval. The Swedish example shows that donor accountability concerns can be met without eschewing multi-year funding arrangements, by making them subject to annual parliamentary approval. This is a formula which other donors could further explore.

Like most donors, Sweden’s relationship to the NGOs it funds is governed by a trusted relationship—including pre-screening—with certain international and Swedish NGOs on whom it repeatedly relies to implement its humanitarian aid programmes. A select number of Swedish NGOs also have access to rapid-response funds for contingencies. Sweden obtains second place in the indicator on supporting contingency planning.

Its multilateralist credentials are further boosted by its top performance in the fourth pillar “Implementing international guiding principles,” based on its excellent record in implementing the core instruments of international humanitarian law (1) and of human rights (joint first with Spain). Promotion and respect for IHL, refugee, and human rights law are all anchored in its humanitarian policy statement. In its GHD Implementation Plan, also Sweden cites ongoing activities in these areas, including training programmes and financial support to the ICRC, the foremost organisation with a mandate for promoting IHL.

It is also deemed by the humanitarian field to be among the top four donors for its engagement in risk mitigation, enhancing security, protecting human rights, and affirming the primary role of civilian organisations in the delivery of humanitarian aid. These are all firmly enshrined within its Policy Document. In addition, there is a strict limit on the funding that can be channelled to projects implemented by the military.

In many respects, Sweden is a model GHD donor, as it has managed to incorporate the GHD *Principles* into its own institutional operating environment. The government’s humanitarian aid policy documents explicitly spells out its commitment to the Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) guidelines and the primary role of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian aid. It has also introduced a strong rights perspective into its humanitarian programme, which has been effective in promoting the rights of the child, especially in armed conflicts and during reconstruction.

The results for Sweden also point to some weaker areas, notably in pillar 2, “Integrating relief and development.” Here, although it has devoted considerable attention to this area—including ensuring that implementing organisations ensure the participation of beneficiaries as per grant guidelines, spelling out a strategy<sup>27</sup> for the integration of humanitarian aid and development cooperation within its Policy—the opinion of the field is that it does less well in supporting long-term development aims (15), in consulting with beneficiaries on design and implementation (14), monitoring and evaluation (14), or in strengthening the resilience to cope with crises (12).

This is an area that has also been flagged in Sweden’s OECD Peer Review, warning that “management of transition situations has become less flexible due to changes on what can be financed through the development cooperation budget and the budget line for humanitarian assistance and conflict management.” Until 2005, SIDA could operate development cooperation

programmes through its humanitarian arm but the new guidelines stipulate that transition should be covered primarily by the development cooperation budget and occasionally through the humanitarian budget.<sup>28</sup>

Its record in the first pillar, concerning needs-based response, also suffers from low or mediocre rankings. These suggest that its funding within the UN Appeals could be better focused towards Appeal priority sectors (23) and, to a lesser extent, the lack of timeliness of funding to onset disasters (12), with only 42 percent of its funding committed or disbursed within the first month of the onset of a disaster. The former suggests that the framework for Sweden's sector policies, the *Policy for Global Development*, may be spreading its priorities too thinly across the many sectoral priorities.

### Norway

Norway (2) follows close on the heels of Sweden, achieving excellent rankings for the first four pillars. It comes in second place in the hard data index (5.08) and in fifth place (5.21) in the soft data index. Norway ranks among the top five donors in just under half of all indicators.

Norway does spectacularly well in pillar 1, coming in first place for a needs-based humanitarian response. It is perceived to be doing well at providing timely funding (4), based on needs assessments (2) and for remaining committed to ongoing crises (4). This is backed by hard data indicators, showing Norway's strengths in funding complex emergencies in a timely manner (4) and providing a large share of its funding in cash (5). It also excels in reaching forgotten crises (5), but does relatively poorly at directing its funding to priority sectors identified by the CAPs for respective emergencies (17).

Like Sweden, Norway is a multilateralist at heart, achieving overall second place in pillar 3. Relative to income, it is the most generous donor in funding UN coordination mechanisms and common services, and the second most generous in funding IFRC Appeals. It also comes a joint first for funding the CERF (representing the third most generous donor) and other quick disbursement mechanisms (fourth most generous donor), both measured relative to its income. It is also perceived by the humanitarian field to be doing well at facilitating safe humanitarian access (3).

It ranks very high (3) in pillar 4, just behind New Zealand for implementing the core instruments of international humanitarian law (2) and of human rights (3), and supported by favourable views from the field,

especially in enhancing security (3) and protecting human rights (4).

Norway does rather less well in supporting learning and accountability initiatives (pillar 5), where it achieves an overall mediocre ranking (14), due to perceived weakness in supporting learning and accountability initiatives (16) or encouraging regular evaluations (15). This is supported by the hard data showing a lack of commitment to the main humanitarian accountability initiatives (11) and of support to other accountability initiatives (17).

A major weakness in this respect is that, unlike Sweden, Norway does not have a comprehensive policy document that sets out its humanitarian policies. In this sense, it is less accountable, as it makes it difficult to assess how it sets its priorities for humanitarian action.<sup>29</sup>

### European Commission

In fifth place overall, the European Commission's strong showing in the Index reflects a good result (7) in the hard data index.<sup>30</sup> However, its tenth place in the soft data index may betray some problems with its perception among humanitarian field actors.

The European Commission's stellar performance is in pillar 5, where it is perceived to be strongly supportive of accountability in humanitarian action (2) and of encouraging regular evaluations (1). This is strongly backed up by the hard data variables capturing membership of, attendance at, and funding of the main accountability initiatives and the number of evaluations, on which it does better than all other donors. This good performance may be partly explained by the fact that the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the main channel for the EC's humanitarian aid, is under a legal obligation to evaluate the activities it funds.<sup>31</sup> Evaluations are not just aimed at reviewing ECHO-funded operations, but often form the basis of wide consultation with stakeholders to improve coordination. This has paid off with a high score for consultation with beneficiaries on monitoring and evaluation (4) and for supporting effective coordination efforts (4). In this context, ECHO sees its comparative advantage over individual Member States in being able to "intervene in politically sensitive situation more flexibly,"<sup>32</sup> as it has a neutral past, especially in the context of colonial ties. The EC is examining how to do more to lead and coordinate Member State assistance in politically charged contexts.

The EC's wider engagement with civil society is perceived in a positive light, underscored by its excellent

ranking for promoting the role of NGOs (4). ECHO has fostered strong partnerships with its 200 NGO partners that have signed its framework partnership agreement, which essentially pre-certifies NGOs that fulfill prerequisite requirements, such as sufficient financial, technical, and administrative capacity to be implementing partners. In principle, this should ensure rapid reaction times to crises, although this is not supported by its rankings for the hard data indicators on response times to complex emergencies (9) and to natural disasters (22). ECHO also applies strict criteria with regard to quality and performance of its partner NGOs and carries out an evaluation of its partner NGOs' activities every year and assesses whether they have taken up the recommendations from previous years.<sup>33</sup>

Despite its mandate to foster the transition from emergency aid to rehabilitation and development, the EC has had limited success in this area. It scores well on measures to reduce the vulnerability of populations at risk, for example, for funding local capacity (3) and for strengthening local capacity to deal with crises (7). It is a major supporter of IFRC work in the area of capacity-building and preparedness. However, it receives a lower rank for supporting long-term development aims (10). The ongoing decentralisation of EU aid, now largely delegated to the field, may offer scope for improvement to establish better integration of humanitarian aid with existing development instruments, especially relevant Ministries at the field level, which would build in the local dimension, an important ingredient for successful efforts in this area.

A key characteristic of the EC's humanitarian aid is its lack of flexibility. For example, in pillar 1, it is deemed to do rather poorly on the flexible allocation of funds across emergencies (22) and, similarly, in pillar 3, it receives very low ranks for reducing the earmarking of funds (22) and for the flexibility of its funding (19). This reflects the EC philosophy that funding according to needs implies earmarking funds to those needs. This is underlined by the lowest rank for any donor for the extent of earmarking (23). ECHO is an operational donor with very active field presence, with 43 field offices, including six regional support offices. This, along with its large budget allows it to carry out its own needs-assessments in the field and to "go it alone" in allocating its humanitarian budget accordingly. Its strong field presence and multilateral character enables it to play a strong role in coordination efforts.

It has, thus, been less reliant on multilateral organisations, with larger overhead costs, for implementing its

humanitarian assistance programmes and, compared to its size, channels a much smaller share through the multilateral channels than most other donors. This may be changing. Since 2002, when ECHO reported channeling an unusually high 62 percent of its funding through NGOs, there has been a shift towards a more balanced portfolio and increased funding to the UN and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The EC funding share to the UN had increased from 29 percent in 2002 to 37 percent in 2006, while the funding share to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) stood at 11 percent, with the remaining 52 percent going to NGOs.<sup>34</sup>

Although ECHO supports the new trend of pooled funding mechanisms, including the CERF and country-level funds, it has decided not to contribute to them, citing its own accountability requirements which prevent it from committing its funds to these unearmarked mechanisms, the fact that CERF funds cannot be allocated to NGOs, as well as the lack of *additional* budgetary resources, stipulated by the General Assembly.<sup>35,36</sup> Its own internal financial regulations also do not allow ECHO to pay a "double overhead charge," one for the CERF or country-level fund and then again for the implementing partner that receives the funds. Because of its strong field presence, enabling it both to attend field coordination meetings and to disburse funds at least as quickly, ECHO sees no added value in contributing to pooled funding.

Relying on its own needs assessments has presumably secured the EC its good result for the indicator assessing funding based on needs assessments (5) in pillar 1, but performance in this pillar is also marred by low grades—especially vis-à-vis its overall ranking—for upholding the basic principles of humanitarian action, for example, alleviation of suffering (13), impartiality (15), neutrality (17) and independence (16). These may suggest that there is still scope for improving the EC's decisions to grant humanitarian aid so that they are based "solely on an assessment of the beneficiary populations' needs," its stated policy.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, its rankings for funding to forgotten emergencies (8) and relative to its own global needs assessment methodology (14) strongly reinforce this point.

It is also hoped that the ongoing consultation round on EU humanitarian action<sup>38</sup> should help to refocus it towards the GHD *Principles*, giving its needs-based orientation a welcome boost and should help to strengthen EU humanitarian policy and to achieve

greater efficiency and coherence in delivering its humanitarian aid.

### **Ireland and New Zealand**

Ireland and New Zealand—by any definition small countries with correspondingly “small” humanitarian aid budgets—jointly accounted for about 1 percent of total DAC GDP in 2006. Their relative strong showings in the HRI, with ranks of 6 and 8, respectively, reflect a number of factors. First, New Zealand is an extremely strong performer in the integrating relief and development pillar and in those principles captured under pillar 4, on implementing international guiding principles, it has a rank of 1 and 2, respectively. It also earns high scores on those indicators which track commitment to learning and accountability initiatives, flexibility of funding, and funding which is committed on the basis of needs and needs assessments. Ireland has a rank of 3 in the pillar with the greatest weight in the index, responding to humanitarian needs, and also has particularly high scores in those indicators capturing the existence of flexible and timely funding arrangements, shows strong commitment to the strengthening of local capacity to deal with crises and works very well with nongovernmental organisations in the implementation of humanitarian actions. The fact that two small countries such as Ireland and New Zealand occupy relatively privileged positions in the HRI provides clear indication that the Index is able to discriminate efficiency aspects of humanitarian action from volumes of aid provided, and that it does not unfairly penalise countries which do not have large humanitarian assistance operations and the large bureaucracies that sometimes accompany them.

### **Canada**

Canada has a very respectable ranking of 7 in the HRI, with a particularly good performance (either top 5 or 6) in the pillars integrating relief with development, implementing international guiding principles, and promoting learning and accountability. Canada’s humanitarian funding is generally free of historical ties and/or geographic proximity considerations (2), and its humanitarian actions are broadly consistent with implementing international guiding principles, with ranks of 3 and 5, respectively, on support for the principal legal instruments on human rights and international humanitarian law. Canada excels in other areas as well, with top-five ranks in funding allocations to priority sectors (4), in funding which is allocated to the most needy and vulnerable

countries (12), in the predictability of its funding allocations to key humanitarian partners (5) and in delivering funds which, on the whole, are not subject to rigid earmarking constraints (5). Canada appears to take very seriously the principle which pertains to the need to undertake “regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises,” ranking third in terms of the number of self and joint evaluations of humanitarian assistance interventions.

Nevertheless, there are some areas of weakness where Canada’s performance could improve considerably. Among them, one can point to funding allocations less driven by media coverage and/or sectoral considerations and the need to more evenly distribute resources toward forgotten emergencies from other types of emergencies (18). In the area of responding to humanitarian needs (pillar 1), Canada could improve response times as they apply to complex emergencies and onset disasters (16). Funding to strengthen the capacity of countries to respond to crises is yet another area where Canada’s performance (18) could be boosted.

On the whole, Canada’s performance is encouraging, with a large number of key aspects of the principles being fully reflected in its humanitarian interventions. There is broad consistency between the results of the survey and the hard data indicators and the few areas of weakness seem amenable to improvement with slight reorientations of policy.

### **United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom, known for its important role in promoting change and reform within the system, achieves a respectable ninth place in the Index, but does better in the hard data index (8), capturing many funding indicators, than in the soft data index (13), which reflects the views of the humanitarian field. Across the whole range of indicators, it is among the top five in just under a quarter of the indicators. The UK’s strengths lie in the pillars working with humanitarian partners and promoting learning and accountability, where it ranks fourth in both instances.

In pillar 3, it is perceived to be doing well at providing predictable funding (4) and at having introduced longer-term funding arrangements (5), as well as at facilitating safe humanitarian access (5) and supporting contingency planning and capacity building efforts (5). These achievements are backed to some degree by the hard data, giving the UK a high ranking for the predictability of donor funding (2). The UK also stands out for its very generous funding to the main quick



disbursement mechanisms (some US\$155 million or 55 percent of the total contributed by all OECD/DAC countries), coming in joint first place and representing the third most generous donor relative to income, and for its support to UNDAC (4). Despite its key role in promoting the CERF, the UK falls just short of receiving a top-five rank for the CERF indicator, mainly because, relative to its income, it comes seventh for this indicator, despite having given by far the largest absolute contribution (US\$69 million in 2006).

Other strengths include “supporting learning and accountability” initiatives, strongly supported by both the soft and hard data variables. It is ranked fourth by the field for supporting learning and accountability initiatives, and also comes fourth in both hard data indicators measuring membership, attendance at and funding of the main accountability initiatives, and the number of joint and individual evaluations it undertakes.

Weaknesses are concentrated in pillars 1 and 4, supported in equal measure by hard and soft data indices. The UK achieves its lowest pillar ranking (18) for “Implementing international guiding principles,” mainly because it has not implemented as many core legal instruments related to IHL and human rights as have other peer countries. However, the view from the field is also fairly critical in its assessment of the UK, leaving it with low ranks for such politically-charged indicators as enhancing security (18), protecting human rights (18), or affirming the primary role of civilian organisations (16).

Its performance in pillar 1 is mixed. Behind its eleventh place for this pillar lie some positive achievements, notably in the timeliness of its funding to complex emergencies (5), and in the concentration of its funding to identified needs, both to priority sectors identified within the CAPs (5), as well as relative to ECHO’s Vulnerability Index (1). However, it does rather less well by favouring countries with which it shares historical ties or that are within its relative geographic proximity (21) when disbursing its humanitarian aid. Also, the soft data unequivocally takes a negative view of the UK’s commitment to the basic principles of humanitarian action, including the alleviation of suffering (15), impartiality (16), neutrality (19), and independence (18).

### Switzerland

Switzerland, on tenth place in the overall Index, enjoys a much better perception in the humanitarian field than its hard data bear out. It occupies fourth place in the soft data index and only tenth in the hard data index. It

achieves a top-five ranking in just over a third of the indicators (38 percent).

Across the five pillars, Switzerland’s performance is fairly equal, ranging from its best rank (8) in pillar two on “integrating relief and development” to 14th place in pillar four, which encompasses the main international guiding principles.

Switzerland undoubtedly has a number of strengths, possibly gained by its long experience in the humanitarian enterprise. For example, it is quite clear that, within the first pillar, the field takes the view that Switzerland is very much living up to its humanitarian tradition by being faithful to the basic principles of alleviation of suffering (4), impartiality (2), neutrality (1) and independence (3). Its impartiality is lent further credence by high rankings in the hard data indicators on the distribution of funding relative to historical ties or geographic proximity (5) and to forgotten emergencies (2). It is also perceived to provide timely funding (3), although this is certainly not borne out by the two hard data indicators on timely funding to complex emergencies (18) and to onset disasters (19). Moreover, the needs-based orientation of its funding is further thrown into doubt by poor rankings for funding to priority sectors identified within the CAPs and relative to ECHO’s Vulnerability Index.

In the second pillar on integrating relief and development, Switzerland’s perceived ability to strengthen resilience to cope with crises (3) and its funding to capacity building (2) suggest that it has had some success in reaching out to the local level. An excellent ranking for promoting NGOs (2) within pillar 3 “Working with humanitarian partners” further supports this notion. In this pillar, Switzerland also stands out for its support to UNDAC (2) and, as expected, takes first place in its funding of ICRC Appeals in its true humanitarian tradition.

### United States

The United States is 16th among the 23 OECD-DAC countries in the overall ranking. It also occupies 16th place in the soft data index but only 20th place for the hard data. Its performance across the five pillars is uneven, with a strong showing (2) in pillar 5 encompassing learning and accountability, balanced against the worst performance of any country (23) in pillar 4, on implementing international guiding principles.

Its stellar performance in pillar 5 is based on an excellent perception in the field that the U.S. supports accountability in humanitarian action (1) and encourages

regular evaluations (4). This is strongly borne out by the hard data, with high rankings on membership, attendance of, and funding to the main accountability initiatives (7), and the number of joint and individual evaluations performed (2).

The US ranks 16th in the first pillar, capturing a needs-based response. Predictably, it attracts some of the lowest rankings for perceptions about its respect for basic humanitarian principles: alleviation of suffering (18), impartiality (21), neutrality (23), and independence (23). On the other hand, it does rather well in distributing its funding relative to identified needs, relative to both the priority sectors within CAPs (6) and to ECHO's vulnerability index (2).

In pillar 2, the US receives overall endorsement by the field for consultation with beneficiaries on monitoring and evaluation (2), strengthening preparedness for emergencies (4), and supporting rapid recovery of sustainable livelihoods (2), all suggesting a solid performance in support of civil society initiatives. This is underpinned by a good ranking for promoting the role of NGOs (8) in pillar 3.

Across the other pillars, three other points stand out. First, it receives high ranks for donor preparedness in implementing humanitarian action (3) and in facilitating safe humanitarian access (6), both possible reflections of the international clout of the U.S. Second, the U.S. performs poorly on flexibility of funding indicators, for example, for earmarking funding and for a low share of cash in total funding (both 22). Finally, it does not operate naturally as a multilateralist, appearing somewhat stingy in its funding to these mechanisms, for example, to IFRC (18) and ICRC Appeals (14), and to the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals (13).

### Spain

Spain has an overall rank of 17 in the HRI. On the positive side, Spain has a good score on the indicator which gauges distribution of funding to emergencies relative to degree of media coverage, the sector to which funding is allocated, and whether the emergency is classified as forgotten (3). Spain does also well on the pillar which captures the implementation of international guiding principles, achieving a rank of 6 overall in this component of the HRI. On the whole, however, it does not score particularly well on the needs-based pillar (15), mainly due to its failure to fund priority sectors (22), vulnerable countries (18), and to free itself from its historical legacy (16).

Like Italy, however, Spain has a number of weaknesses which cut across a large number of the indicators present in virtually all the other pillars. Noteworthy are: low prioritisation of support for strengthening local capacity to prevent and mitigate crises, low levels of support to UN coordination mechanisms and non-governmental organisations, insufficient predictability in such support where it exists, low levels of support to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to IFRC and ICRC Annual and Emergency Appeals, low levels of funding to pooled mechanisms for contingency planning, and weak commitment to learning and accountability initiatives. In other words, it is not much of a multilateralist and does not fully embrace the culture of transparency and accountability, hallmarks of the top performers. However, Spain is not an ungenerous donor; ODA levels in relation to GDP in 2006 were somewhere in the middle range among OECD members, well below the likes of Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, and Denmark, but above many others. Its performance under the HRI suggest that, like Italy, much can be done to improve the policy and institutional framework for humanitarian action, to enhance the efficiency of those resources which are delivered in the context of various emergencies and crises.

### France

France has a rank of 19 in the HRI, immediately behind Japan (18). This rank reflects uniformly low scores on the survey, with a rank of 21 overall and its best performance (19) in the pillar capturing aspects of the relationship with humanitarian partners, and a somewhat more mixed performance on the hard data indicators. Essentially, the only indicators for which France can be said to be doing well are those capturing the implementation of international guiding principles, as reflected in a rank of 3 for support for international humanitarian law and the principal legal instruments on human rights. France's humanitarian assistance is not sufficiently independent from considerations of historical ties and geographic proximity with the recipient country (20). It is, likewise, closely correlated to other factors, such as media coverage, unduly concentrated on a couple of sectors, and does not pay enough attention to the needs of forgotten emergencies. France does particularly poorly on pillar 2, capturing aspects of the integration of relief and development, where its hard data ranking (21) is strongly corroborated by its ranking in the survey (22). In relation to ODA, France allocates the lowest levels of funding (23) to strengthening the

capacity of countries and local communities to deal with crises and to various multilateral mechanisms which have been established to enhance capacity for crises prevention and recovery (22).

France contributes well below its “fair share” to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals, to the IFRC and ICRC Annual and Emergency Appeals and to the CERF. In all these indicators its ranking is 17 or worse. It does no better on those variables which underscore the ability to work effectively with other humanitarian partners. Funding to UN coordination mechanisms and common services and to quick disbursement mechanisms is, likewise, well below its fair share in relation to DAC GDP. France is clearly not closely aligned with the principles enshrined in the GHD, so it is clear that a greater emphasis on better tailoring humanitarian aid policy toward the GHD can only lead to improvements in France’s relative position in the HRI, particularly given the size of its aid budget and overall international presence.

### Italy

Italy is a large country with a small aid budget. Official development assistance in relation to GDP in 2006 was among the lowest in the OECD, indeed only marginally higher than that of Greece and the United States, the two countries with the lowest ODA/GNI ratios in the DAC. Italy ranks 22 in the HRI, reflecting a number of weaknesses, including, but not limited to, funding practices which do not often reflect due regard for need and needs assessments, low scores on the indicators included in the pillar integrating relief and development, low levels of funding to UN coordination mechanisms, to non-governmental organisations, to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and to CERF, low levels of funding to UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to IFRC and ICRC Annual and Emergency Appeals. Italy also scores poorly on all the indicators which capture commitment to learning and accountability initiatives. There is clearly much room for improvement in enhancing the efficiency of Italy’s humanitarian actions.

## V. Conclusions

This chapter sets out the underlying methodology we have developed for DARA’s Humanitarian Response Index 2007, the first of its kind. The HRI combines a large number of quantitative indicators developed to

assess donor country compliance with respect to the *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship* by means of hard data and a Survey capturing the views of a large number of agencies involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Thus, it is singularly well placed to examine donor behaviour in relation to the *Principles*. The HRI is an international benchmarking exercise intended to provide a framework for the identification of a broad array of factors that play a critical role in enhancing the efficiency of humanitarian actions. It allows donors to identify their own strengths and weaknesses with respect to their actions as humanitarian donors, and permits an international cross-country comparison against best practices. Over time, as the Index is compiled on an annual basis, it will also allow each donor a vertical comparison of its own performance over time.

This study has taken the unambiguous view that for the *Principles* to be operationally meaningful, they cannot be solely interpreted as a collective undertaking. A call for “regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance” is surely given greater meaning by initiatives, such as the HRI, that deliver a tool for assessing individual donor performance. The HRI is a powerful tool that can help donors identify and quantify their strengths and weaknesses and is complementary to other ongoing efforts to improve donor performance and accountability, with the ultimate aim of improving the quality of humanitarian assistance.

Since it is clear that the HRI country results show a strong correlation between hard and soft data indices, reinforcing each other, we may have even greater confidence in the conclusions drawn at the country level (see Figure 1).

Sweden is the best-ranking donor in the Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) 2007, excelling in a broad number of areas. Underlying its outstanding performance in responding to humanitarian needs, the heart of the GHD, is a strong policy focus on funding forgotten emergencies. Sweden provides timely and flexible funding to humanitarian crises. Its ability to deliver on its commitment to the GHD Principles is boosted by their incorporation into its comprehensive humanitarian aid policy.

Sweden is unambiguously multilateralist in its approach to humanitarian action, supporting and facilitating coordination efforts, including in the field, in order to determine needs. It is a strong financial backer of the UN and the Red Cross Movement, and has

generously funded the CERF, UN, IFRC, and ICRC Appeals, as well as other quick disbursement mechanisms, thereby ensuring that its multilateral aid is timely and flexible. Sweden also offers multi-year funding arrangements. The Swedish example suggests that donors' accountability concerns can be met without eschewing multi-year funding arrangements, by making them subject to annual parliamentary approval.

Like most donors, Sweden's relationship to the NGOs it funds is governed by a trusted relationship—including pre-screening—to certain international and Swedish NGOs it repeatedly relies on to implement its humanitarian aid programmes. A select number of Swedish NGOs also have access to rapid response funds for contingencies.

The analysis has also highlighted four important concerns: a) the lack of an operating definition for humanitarian aid, b) gaps in data coverage due to conceptual inconsistencies on how to measure humanitarian aid, c) the low priority given to timely and accurate data reporting, and d) the lack of a widely accepted global needs assessment framework on which to base strategic decisions that can better tailor response to need.

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## Notes

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- 2 See Smillie and Minear, 2003.
- 3 See <http://www.goodhumanitarianandonorship.org>
- 4 The term humanitarian *action* is wider than humanitarian *assistance* in that it includes protection as a central element.
- 5 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 6 Austria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain.
- 7 See Graves and Wheeler, 2006; Harmer et al., 2004; Willitts-King, 2004.
- 8 See [www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews)
- 9 In addition to the *Principles*, OECD (2004) suggests that other relevant principles and guidelines that can guide the Peer Review process include the *UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182*, designed to strengthen the United Nations' response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters, and to improve the overall effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field; the Sphere standards; the *Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct*; and the 2001 DAC guidelines *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*.
- 10 OECD, 2004, p.11.
- 11 These were Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK.
- 12 See Development Initiatives, 2006.
- 13 See <http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/GHDDRC-indicatorsrevised18-12-2003.doc> for a listing of the indicators. The reader is also referred to Bijote and Bugnion (2004) for a comprehensive evaluation of the Burundi Good Humanitarian Donorship Pilot.
- 14 The categories are: donor funding was flexible and timely (P 5); donor and agency funding was allocated on the basis of needs assessment (P 6); local capacities were strengthened (P 8); donors supported the UN leadership and coordination role (P 10a); earmarking was reduced (P 13a); funding was made available on a long-term basis (P 13b); recovery and long-term development was linked to humanitarian programmes (P 9); funding requirements for assistance effort was shared equitably among donors (P 14a); established good practices were adhered to by humanitarian implementing partners (P 15); safe humanitarian access was promoted (P 17); contingency planning was supported by donors (P 18); military assets were used appropriately (P 19b); performance was evaluated (P 22); contributions were reported in a timely and accurate fashion (P 23a).
- 15 See Kinkela et al., 2004.
- 16 See Graves and Wheeler, 2006.
- 17 See OECD, 2006b; Graves and Wheeler, 2006; DFID, 2006, p.16.
- 18 A collective indicator may show improvement over time for the members of the group. But this could, for instance, reflect outstanding performance by a handful of countries and mediocre performance by the majority. A monitoring mechanism which is prone to free-riding behaviour would not appear to be consistent with the spirit of Principle 22 which calls for "regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance."
- 19 This is in line with, for instance, the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey, which captures the contemporary views of senior enterprise managers regarding obstacles to the creation of a better business environment, and the several surveys which go into the formulation of Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*.
- 20 For example, OCHA, the Resident or Humanitarian Coordinator, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and representations of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
- 21 Note that OECD (2004), p. 10, uses the following (overlapping) categorisation: (1) Humanitarian Policies (P1–10); Funding (P5, 6, 11–14); Promotion of Standards and enhanced implementation (P14–P0); Learning and Accountability (P7, 21–23).
- 22 The exception concerns the three hard data indicators used in pillar 5, where the indicator on the number of evaluations is given twice the weight of the indicators on promoting learning and accountability initiatives.
- 23 Other organisations have dealt with this methodological issue in different ways. For instance, in the World Economic Forum's *Global Competitiveness Index 2006–2007*, a total of 90 factors have been grouped in nine distinct pillars, capturing different dimensions of the business environment. Each pillar, however, has been weighed equally within each of three separate subgroups (stages of development) and, within each pillar, each factor has, in turn, also received equal weighting. In deciding this approach, the primary consideration was whether there was a *priori* information, either empirical or based on theory, which suggested that some indicators were more important than others. In the case of the WEF's competitiveness index, those involved in its design came to the view that although intuition and empirical experience suggested that some indicators might indeed be more important than others within each pillar, there were no sound theoretical considerations that would credibly justify



allocating different weights to different factors. However, the HRI is linked to the *Principles* and there seems to be broad consensus among humanitarian experts that some are more important than others, thus justifying a more flexible weighting structure.

- 24 References on Sweden: DARA questionnaire 2007; Swedish Government Communication 2004/05:52 (The Government's Humanitarian Aid Policy); OECD (2005) DAC Peer Review: Sweden; GHD Domestic Implementation Plan for Sweden (2005).
- 25 OECD, 2005 (Sweden), p. 36.
- 26 Numbers in parentheses in the country descriptions refer to rankings on the HRI.
- 27 Swedish Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA, 2005), "Reducing the risk of disasters: SIDA's effort to reduce poor people's vulnerability to hazards."
- 28 OECD, 2005, Sweden, p. 37.
- 29 See OECD (2005), Norway.
- 30 In contrast to other countries, there are a few hard data indicators which do not apply in the case of the European Commission, and in these cases, the HRI estimation for the EC excluded these. For instance, the indicators on the funding of UN coordination mechanisms and common services or of the CERF were judged not to apply to the EC due to its own size, field presence, and rapid response capacity, which means that it needs to rely much less on UN mechanisms than other smaller donors.
- 31 Specifically, the legal basis is Article 18 of the Humanitarian Regulation that stipulates that the Commission is required to "regularly assess humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether they have achieved their objectives and to produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent operations."
- 32 OECD, 2007, European Community DAC Peer Review, p. 97.
- 33 ECHO (2006), 2006 Operational Strategy, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/information/strategy/strat\\_rep\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/information/strategy/strat_rep_en.htm)
- 34 Directorate-General ECHO, Financial Report 2006, p. 13.
- 35 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (A/RES/46/182), 78th plenary meeting, 19 December 1991, para. 24, specifies that contributions to the fund should be on an "additional basis."
- 36 OECD (2007), DAC Peer Review of the European Community.
- 37 Ibid., Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid states that humanitarian aid decisions "must be taken impartially and solely according to the victims' needs and interests" and "must not be guided by, or subject to, political considerations."
- 38 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, COM (2007) 317 final, 13.6.2007: Brussels.